Inter-LGU Cooperation: The Key to the Issues of a Devolved Health Care System by Solon, Orville
Policy Notes








  evolution became a byword in 1991  when the
   Local Government Code passed legislation and
  mandated, among others, that the delivery of
social services be decentralized or devolved from the
national government to the local government units or
LGUs. It was considered a big step in ensuring that so-
cial services reach the grass roots level where the LGUs
can be more effective. Seven years after, certain con-
cerns and problems have emerged and cast doubts on
the viability of a devolved health care system. Indeed,
opponents to the idea of devolution have entertained
notions that perhaps it might be wise to return to the old
system.
The roundtable discussion held in Cebu City late
last year that was sponsored by the Health Policy Devel-
opment Staff of the Department of Health (DOH), the
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), and
the DOH Regional Office in Cebu, however, came up with
a resounding consensus that re-nationalization is not  the
answer. Rather, the emanating issues should be seen as
an opportunity to continually refine the system in order
to realize its full potential and purpose. What is needed
is to strengthen the devolved health care system by em-
powering the LGUs.
Devolution: Identifying the Problems
In his presentation, Dr. Orville Solon, professor at
the UP School of Economics and director of the com-
pleted joint DOH-PIDS project on Baseline Research on
Health Care Financing Reforms, set out to identify some
of the problems that confront the devolved health care
system. He likewise offered possible answers to address
these problems by formulating a comprehensive policy
framework that matched each problem with an attendant
solution.
To begin with, what are these problems?
Re-nationalization of some hospitals Re-nationalization of some hospitals Re-nationalization of some hospitals Re-nationalization of some hospitals Re-nationalization of some hospitals
Even as devolution should have put all public hospi-
tals under the control of their respective LGUs, the DOH
continues to retain 48 hospitals under its control, 35
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Primary hospitals 6 271 643 920
Secondary hospitals 7 281 384 672
Tertiary hospitals 35 44 148 227
RHUs 2,856 2,856
BHSs 17,090 17,090
Private clinics n.a. n.a.
DOH LGU Private Total
of which are classified as tertiary: hospitals that are fully
departmentalized and equipped to treat most ailments
(Table 1). He said that the number might have already
risen to 54 because the DOH regularly brings back into
the fold other hospitals that have been re-nationalized
by Congress.
The retention of these hospitals under DOH control
may not matter much if it were not for the fact that the
DOH pours 52 percent of its annual budget to subsidize
them. According to Dr. Solon, these hospitals were also
prioritized in the distribution of the P6.5 billion budget
given out by the Department in 1992 instead of frontliners
like the district and provincial hospitals where the poor
usually go to. District and provincial hospitals are consid-
ered primary and secondary health facilities (those that
offer basic or limited treatments). The 1995 Family In-
come Expenditure Survey (FIES) shows that the poorest
30 percent of the population go to primary and second-
ary public hospitals when they are sick. Thus, the re-
nationalization of some tertiary hospitals is deemed un-
fair because, as Dr. Solon put it, the poor in Quezon City
do not go to such high-end hospitals like the Philippine
Heart Center or the Philippine Childrens Hospital. Even
if they do, the poor people in other parts of the country
are disadvantaged since they cannot avail of the services
of these said hospitals. Thus, although the subsidy given
by the national government is used for the poor, it does
not include all the poor people in the country. Yet, the
funding came from everybody.
Fragmentation of services Fragmentation of services Fragmentation of services Fragmentation of services Fragmentation of services
According to Dr. Solon, administrative fragmenta-
tion of services occurs at different levels because of a
lack of referral networking among health care providers.
In the past, the national government controlled all public
health facilities from the central office down to the re-
gional districts. Today, however, the regional health units
(RHUs) and barangay health centers are run by the mu-
nicipalities while the provincial and district hospitals are
controlled by the provinces. The RHUs and barangay cen-
ters are not connected with the district or provincial hos-
pitals. This proves disadvantageous because the less
capable health centers have difficulty getting the services
of the hospitals that have well-trained doctors and better
facilities.
In cases where health units are linked, it is only
through informal personal contacts and not institutional-
ized arrangements. Thus, technical fragmentation hap-
pens. Increased networking is not necessary if only inter-
relationships among the health units will be formally es-
tablished.
Administrative risks for public hospitals Administrative risks for public hospitals Administrative risks for public hospitals Administrative risks for public hospitals Administrative risks for public hospitals
It was also learned that public hospitals are at risk
of losing their competitive edge over private hospitals
due to the higher costs of operating them if quality ad-
justments are to be factored in. Quality adjustments in-
clude, for example, necessities like running water and
electricity at a standard number of hours. In a compari-
son of hospital bills at both public and private hospitals,
primary and secondary public hospitals were shown to
be very competitive as their bills were lower. However, it
turns out to be more expensive in the public tertiary hos-
pitals when the rates are quality-adjusted.
Dr. Solon stressed that it is not the price of medi-
cal services that led to the higher price but the cost of
running the hospital. In effect, public tertiary hospitals
need to spend more to have electricity and water supply
for them to match the level of quality of services of their
private counterparts.




The significant implication is that public hospitals
have become vulnerable to budgetary allocations by LGUs
for electricity and water supply. Less funds for these items
would certainly affect the efficiency of and quality of ser-
vice in these hospitals whose main clientele happen to
be mostly the poor.
Mismatches of fund allocations Mismatches of fund allocations Mismatches of fund allocations Mismatches of fund allocations Mismatches of fund allocations
First mismatch: curative vs. preventive health ser-
vices. An ounce of prevention is supposed to be worth a
pound of cure but in the case of the health care delivery
system in the country, the reverse is true. A lot more
funds are spent on curative health services than on pre-
ventive health care programs and services.
which Dr. Solon further qualified as hospital-based ter-
tiary care services. Conversely, a mere P13 out of every
P100 goes to public health services that involve preven-
tive measures such as immunization for transmissible
diseases, dengue early warning devices, proper nutrition
and other programs. This is unfortunate because, as Dr.
Solon pointed out, preventive health care services do a
lot more in the long run in protecting the peoples health
and require less amounts of money than medical treat-
ments. Immunizing people from hepatitis or TB, for ex-
ample, lessens the risk of transmitting the disease to
others, thereby saving would-be patients and the govern-
ment from costly treatments. But since only P13 is alloted
for public health services, the governments preventive
health care programs cannot adequately address the
needs of the public. The spread of dengue that killed
more than 200 people a few months ago indicates just
how important preventive public health care programs
are.
Second mismatch: IRA distribution for various LGU
health expenditures. Another mismatch in the allocation
of funds is that the amount of Internal Revenue Allot-
ment (IRA) received by LGUs from the national govern-
ment and the amount they allot from their budget as their
share in the cost of devolved health function are at times
grossly unfair. Data shown in Table 2 indicate that out of
every P100 alloted by provinces to health services, P59
already goes to the salaries of the provincial hospitals
medical personnel. Yet, the provinces only receive P23
per P100 in terms of the IRA. This means that the prov-
inces are shortchanged by as much as P36 or 61 per-
cent. On the other hand, only P3 out of every P100 is
alloted by cities for health services but they get around
P23 per P100 of the IRA. Meanwhile, there was less mis-
match shown in the case of municipalitiesP38 per P100
as expenditure allocations vis-à-vis P34 per P100 in terms
of the IRA. Still, the fact remains that there is a mis-
match.
Third mismatch: big budget vs. nonexistent ex-
penditures. Furthermore, Dr. Solon bared that some of
the P6.5 billion budget of the DOH that was distributed
Dr. Solon cited figures cited in a 1994 study (Racelis
and Herrin) showing the sources of funds being spent on
health services and the patterns of how national health
expenditures are spent on personal (meaning curative),
public (meaning preventive) and other health expenses.
In terms of sources, out of every P100 spent on
health care, P44 comes from government through taxes
on income and services; P38 comes from individual con-
sumers and households as out-of-pocket payments for
medical services; P12 from compulsory insurance like
Medicare; and P6 from private insurance. Based on these
data alone, it shows that the individual consumer bears
the biggest burden of health care expenses since they
pay for them directly.
As for the spending distribution, a total of P71.9
out of every P100 goes to personal health care services
"...Preventive health care services do a
lot more in the long run in protecting
the peoples health and require less




to all public hospitals in 1992 may have gone to some
recipient cities which did not have hospitals to run. In-
deed, the cities received a lot more money than they
should have. An unfortunate result of this is that the
mismatch in fund allocation for health between cities and
provinces has encouraged municipalities to become
cities since cities get a higher amount of IRA but have
much less to spend it on.
Aside from the obvious problem of discrepancy, it
is likewise unsure whether local governments actually
used their IRA for health care for said purpose or whether
they used it for other priorities. Thus, the problem of fund
mismatch on health care ser-
vices poses an urgent call for
government to resolve since
this will determine how effec-
tive the devolved health care
delivery system could be imple-
mented.
The Value of Inter-LGU
Cooperation
In the face of all these
problems, are there solutions?
Dr. Solon offered that in the
case of the devolved health
care delivery system situation, inter-LGU cooperation may
potentially be the answer. He cited the gains that may be
reaped by promoting inter-LGU cooperation in terms of
financing and delivering health care services to the people
at the local level.
Scale economies Scale economies Scale economies Scale economies Scale economies
Buying in bulk is always cheaper. The same is true
when applied to inter-cooperation among LGUs. First,
catchment areas of hospital facilities are larger than lo-
cal jurisdiction. For instance, Bulacan has a district hos-
pital at the border of Nueva Ecija where most of the pa-
tients come from. If funding is left solely to the province
of Bulacan, this situation poses a problem since the lo-
cal leaders in Bulacan may resent the cross-border utili-
zation. However, if there is cooperation and cost-sharing
between the two provinces, the problem can be solved.
In fact, the combined funds from the two LGUs would
boost the hospitals services.
The second gain from inter-LGU cooperation is re-
lated to the fact that health programs tend to have large
spillovers since there are health problems that cannot
be confined to one local area. The spread of dengue fe-
ver is a good example. As such, its solution may likewise
be adequately addressed jointly. Another advantage of
cooperation concerns health insurance. Health insurance
will only work if there is a large pool of members. Dr.
Solon pointed out that a province-wide or city-wide pool
of health insurance members
can cross-subsidize poor
comunities and thus help the
local health financing scheme
remain viable. Finally, the cost
of upgrading dilapidated facili-
ties is too large for a single
LGU to shoulder. Thus, addi-
tional funds from other local
government units are needed.
These can be attained through
inter-LGU cooperation.
LGU IRA CODEF CDHF
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Provinces 23.0 45.6 59.0
Cities 23.0 7.0 3.0
Municipalities 34.0 47.4 38.0
Barangays 20.0 0.0 0.0
CODEF: Cost of devolved functions
CDHF: Cost of devolved health function
Table 2. IRA Distribution vis-à-vis LGU
Health Expenditures
Scope economies Scope economies Scope economies Scope economies Scope economies
Scope economies make
it easier for LGUs to simultaneously manage public health
programs through a network of facilities meant to ad-
dress all kinds of health problems. LGUs can share com-
mon inputs like laboratory facilities and skilled services
thereby preventing underutilization of facilities and help-
ing bring down costs. Meanwhile, cost-sharing schemes
could likewise address the problem of IRA mismatch.
Since cities enjoy the benefit of receiving a large IRA
without a corresponding number of facilities to spend
on, LGUs can resolve it by agreeing on an arrangement
that will benefit concerned areas without having to vio-
late the law.
Levels and venues for inter-LGU cooperation Levels and venues for inter-LGU cooperation Levels and venues for inter-LGU cooperation Levels and venues for inter-LGU cooperation Levels and venues for inter-LGU cooperation
Cooperation may be arranged among municipalities,
between municipal and provincial levels, among provinces5
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in order that cooperation among LGUs will be fully ac-
cepted and adopted by local government units all over
the country as a means to advance their respective health
care services and programs. In this regard, the DOH can
do much to break the barriers.
Clear the ambiguous DOH Policy Clear the ambiguous DOH Policy Clear the ambiguous DOH Policy Clear the ambiguous DOH Policy Clear the ambiguous DOH Policy
Primarily, the national policy on devolution should
be devoid of ambiguities. As it is, the DOH seems nei-
ther strongly committed to implement devolution or to
return to the policy of a nationalized health care system
(during the discussion, though, it was revealed that the
current Secretary of Health, Hon. Alberto Romualdez, has
stressed that as long as he is at the helm of DOH, there
will be no re-nationalization). It is still at the stage of
debating the merits of these two policies. The result is
that the creeping re-nationalization, as Dr. Solon terms
it, of health services keeps cropping up and muddles the
efforts to enhance the health care delivery system. Such
ambiguity confuses the local government leaders and
forces them to adopt what he calls a strategic behavior:
they wait and see what policy will win out.
"...Barriers should be eliminated in order
that cooperation among LGUs will be
fully accepted and adopted all over the
country as a means to advance their
respective health care services and
programs."
and between regions. Dr. Solon, however, suggests that
the most ideal set-up is within the province since there is
a complete network of facilities there from the primary to
the tertiary level.
Cooperation may also be applied in four different
manners. First, through facilities networking where dis-
trict hospitals from other local areas can link with RHUs
from another area so they can share services and ben-
efit from one another. Second, cost-sharing arrangements
or joint investments can help boost the capability of health
facilities. Such arrangements, though, must be institu-
tionalized and contracts must be drawn up to formalize
arrangements. Third, shared financing between LGUs can
bolster their health care programs. Fourth, a common
health program will help to make cost-sharing schemes
work well. For instance, mayors may agree to allot cer-
tain amounts to finance the provinces dengue eradica-
tion project. Such arrangements need to be formally es-
tablished in order that the programs will not be derailed
by leadership changes.
Political will is a critical element in making inter-
LGU cooperation succeed. It is thus important for LGU
leaders to put the interests of the majority of the people
above all things rather than simply concentrate on nar-
row self-interests that will only serve a few.
Clearing the Ambiguities Toward Inter-LGU
Cooperation
Dr. Solon pointed out, though, that there are, unfor-
tunately, barriers that keep inter-LGU cooperation from
being fully realized. These barriers should be eliminated
Make the DOH organization more effective Make the DOH organization more effective Make the DOH organization more effective Make the DOH organization more effective Make the DOH organization more effective
The DOH should also exert every effort to enable
its organization to cope with the new system of devolu-
tion in order to fully realize its optimal purpose. Dr. Solon
said that the national public health programs suffer from
the medical term phantom-limb syndrome which refers
to a person who seems to feel a body part even if it
has already been amputated. Devolution has virtually am-
putated the Department and with the transfer of respon-
sibility (and power) to the local chief executives, made
mayors and governors virtual health secretaries in their
"The DOH should also exert every effort
to enable its organization to cope with
the new system of devolution in order
to fully realize its optimal purpose."6
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respective areas. Still, for the devolved health care sys-
tem to fully succeed, there is a need for the DOH to rein-
vent itself through the adoption of changes in its struc-
ture and organization so as to be more efficient.
Put more emphasis on local hospitals Put more emphasis on local hospitals Put more emphasis on local hospitals Put more emphasis on local hospitals Put more emphasis on local hospitals
Another matter that should be addressed involves
the role of hospitals retained by the DOH vis-à-vis local
hospitals. Instead of complementing local hospitals, these
retained hospitals which are usually more capable and
better equipped than the locals virtually become the
latters substitutes and serve as the primary facilities.
Because of this and because more people use their fa-
cilities, these retained hospitals then ask for bigger sub-
sidies. As a result, local leaders see the futility of up-
grading their local hospitals and are content to just have
their local citizens use the services of the retained hos-
pitals.
Resolve pre-devolution backlog Resolve pre-devolution backlog Resolve pre-devolution backlog Resolve pre-devolution backlog Resolve pre-devolution backlog
The DOH can break another barrier to inter-LGU co-
operation by resolving the backlog of problems before
devolution was implemented. Dr. Solon revealed that in-
vestments that have been earmarked for local health fa-
cilities were never carried through. Thus, the facilities
were already dilapidated when the LGUs took over.
Politics also added to the backlog. In the past, it
was the practice to put up a hospital through legislation
since politicians could easily muster enough votes to pass
a bill that would provide for the establishment of a hospi-
tal. The problem, however, was that the sources of funds
were unclear or sometimes even nonexistent. Further-
more, the plantilla of positions for such hospitals was
"The DOH can break another barrier to
inter-LGU cooperation by resolving the
backlog of problems before devolution
was implemented."
"There is clearly a need to establish legal
instruments and make them available to
local government leaders to strengthen
cooperation among their units."
Institutionalize legal instruments Institutionalize legal instruments Institutionalize legal instruments Institutionalize legal instruments Institutionalize legal instruments
There is clearly a need to establish legal instru-
ments and make them available to local government lead-
ers to strengthen cooperation among their units. As it
stands, local leaders are unsure if there are such instru-
ments provided in the Local Government Code that will
lend legality to any move they wish to make to institution-
alize agreements. Such uncertainty keeps them from
going ahead in forging partnerships.
usually too big, resulting into an overstaffing of some of
these public hospitals.
Work with differences in political affiliations Work with differences in political affiliations Work with differences in political affiliations Work with differences in political affiliations Work with differences in political affiliations
Being in different political parties is obviously a
problem because after all, local government leaders are
also politicians. Cooperation may not be easy to reach
when the leaders are of different political parties. Local
leaders may also have different priorities and thus may
not be too keen on joining forces with other LGUs for
health. Certainly, the politization of health care services
is a reality. But there is also a good side to it since health
programs can be a showcase of the candidates priori-
ties. They can be used to show the people whose candi-
date has a better program.
When the right leader gets elected, however, an-
other problem arises: the planning timeframe for a good
health program is limited by the officials term of office.
Three years is the minimum term of a mayor or governor
and if the constituents believe in his/her programs, the
incumbent may serve for a maximum of nine years. But
the program of establishing inter-LGU cooperation requires
long-term planning and outlook. Changes in leadership
therefore also serves as a barrier at times.7
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to DOH investment for
public facilities.
Introduce a multi-year DOH
budget item to secure the
upgrading of devolved
facilities.
Funding for the formulation
of new IRA formula.
Amend Local Government
Code: take out the 1991
cost of devolved health
function from IRA and





Send a clear signal of DOH
support for the devolved
system.
Finance pilot projects in various
forms of inter-LGU
cooperation.
Express preference for working
with LGU networks in
undertaking public health
programs.
Amend LGC to introduce legal
basis for inter-LGU cooperation
for health.
Table 3. Proposed Policy Framework
Certainly, the DOH cannot do everything by itself to
resolve the issues and problems regarding the full
adoptation and success of inter-LGU cooperation. The
Department, however, can do much to spearhead the
efforts by first coming to terms with its own policy on
devolution and from thereon, break the other barriers
and advance the cause of a better devolved health care
system strengthened by close cooperation among LGUs.
Matching Solutions to Problems:
Policy Framework for Inter-LGU Cooperation
To reiterate, for the Department to effectively re-
solve the issues, it has to, first, clarify the DOH policy on
devolution. The DOHs stance should be made clear be-
cause uncertainty only leads to more problems and hin-
ders long-term planning. Second, the DOH organization
must be made responsive to devolution. The Department
must reorganize its structure in order to complement the
devolved system and help LGUs implement public health
programs and services. Third, block grants should be pro-
vided to solve pre-devolution backlog. Block grants can
be used by the DOH to leverage for better performance
from LGUs. Fourth, the Department may give LGUs a hand
by providing technical support. Research on how to com-
bat dengue fever, administer immunization and so on are
"The Department must reorganize its
structure in order to complement the
devolved system and help LGUs
implement public health programs and
services."
very useful to LGUs. Fifth, advocacy is needed in order
for the DOH and the LGUs to have an effective partnership
in formulating and implementing health programs for the
people.
The DOH has three policy instruments that can be
used to solve the four kinds of general problems identi-
fied, namely: IRA mismatches, pre-devolution backlog,
fragmentation of services and strategic behavior. Table
3 is a matrix presentation of the framework providing
these policy instruments.
Conclusion
In breaking the impassé towards a better devolved
health care delivery system, it is clear that the Depart-8
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ment of Health should not be the only one involved but
also other agencies, including all the branches of govern-
ment. In this regard, Dr. Solon stressed that the DOH
has already done a lot  towards  enabling  the adoption
of inter-LGU cooperation but the process needs to be
institutionalized in order to foster stronger inter-relation-
ships among the LGUs, NGOs and other government and
private entities. This will require coordination and coop-
eration between the executive and legislative branches.
The challenges of devolution may be daunting but
the answer does not lie in going back to the old system
of nationalization. Instead, the solution should be going
forward to empower local government units to join forces
so that they can stand on their own and adequately ad-
dress the health needs of their people.  4
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